These documents, original agreements between settling peoples and native peoples, are essential legal foundations of the United States, as is the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.
Our nation is established physically and ethically upon land gained from the breaking of our own law in such treaties.
For example, the 1791 Treaty between the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation reads: "to preclude FOREVER all disputes"- so "there shall be PERPETUAL peace and friendship"- "establishing PERMANENT peace"- Article VII: states: "The United States SOLEMNLY guarantee to the Cherokee Nation all their lands not hereby ceded."
Our Nation broke these agreements, and did not uphold it's "Solemn Guarantee".
As difficult as it is, there is no other truly just remedy for this situation than for the United States to honor it's Original Treaties as they were written. Or we are no better than conquering barbarians, who keep goods stolen by force, a nation who does not keep it's word, or obey it's own laws.
I think a practical answer to this great injustice is to find individual treaties with land boundaries that are possible to restore, and over whatever time is needed, buy back and return individually titled lands to the ancestors of the rightful owners.
For example, Treaty with the Cherokee, 1791- a land area not that impossible to foresee repurchasing over a century or two. Or, for example, the land area guaranteed to the Nez Perce in the time of the great Chief Joseph. Our only other option is to continue to ignore that our very nation continues to remain on unjustly gained land.
The State of Georgia had decided to ignore the 1791 Treaty, and take land sovereignly owned by the Cherokee Nation. The Supreme Court here avoids the responsibility of the United States to honor it's own treaties in war. This allows Georgia to force the Cherokee Nation onto the "Trail Of Tears". Upon such "legal" judgments the Original Treaties of the United States were broken.
It is a loud ringing historical fact that the Liberty Bell was forever cracked at Chief Justice John Marshall's funeral. His father was my (eight-times-great) Great-Grand-Father. (Through Frantz, Burkholder, Rhoades, Smalley)
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831-
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly be denominated domestic dependent nations.
Had the Indian tribes been foreign nations, in the view of the convention; this exclusive power of regulating intercourse with them might have been, and most probably would have been, specifically given, in language indicating that idea, not in language contradistinguishing them from foreign nations. Congress might have been empowered "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the Indian tribes, and among the several states." This language would have suggested itself to statesmen who considered the Indian tribes as foreign nations, and were yet desirous of mentioning them particularly. It has been also said, that the same words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them when found in different parts of the same instrument: their meaning is controlled by the context. This is undoubtedly true. In common language the same word has various meanings, and the peculiar sense in which it is used in any sentence is to be determined by the context. This may not be equally true with respect to proper names. Foreign nations is a general term, the application of which to Indian tribes, when used in the American constitution, is at best extremely questionable. In one article in which a power is given to be exercised in regard to foreign nations generally, and to the Indian tribes particularly, they are mentioned as separate in terms clearly contradistinguishing from each other. We perceive plainly that the constitution in this article does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term "foreign nations," not, we presume, because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States. When, afterwards, the term "foreign state" is introduced, we cannot impute to the convention the intention to desert its former meaning, and to comprehend Indian tribes within it, unless the context force that construction on us. We find nothing in the context, and nothing in the subject of the article, which leads to it.